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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE

PROCESS-STATUTE ABSOLUTELY

PROHIBITING THE USE OF CONTRACEPTIVES HELD CONSTITUTIONAL.

Buxton v. Ullman (Conn. 1959).
The plaintiffs, in four separate complaints, sought declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of two Connecticut statutes, one of which
absolutely forbids the use of "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for
the purpose of preventing conception,"' and the other of which forbids
the counselling of such use. 2 Three married women complainants alleged
that because of their past medical experience, pregnancy would endanger
either their lives or mental health, or would produce an abnormal child.
Consequently, it was contended that the statute hinders their right to live
normal married lives and thus deprives them of life and liberty without
due process of law. The physician complainant alleged that the statutes
deprive him, without due process, of his right to practice medicine. The
trial court sustained demurrers to the complaints, and the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut affirmed, holding that the statutes were a valid
exercise of the police power and that in view of the legislature's refusal to
revise the statutes, the court could not inject any exceptions into them.
Buxton v. Ullman, 156 A.2d 508 (Conn. 1959).
The passage of the Comstock Act 3 by Congress in 1873 gave rise to
the enactment of much state legislation4 designed to suppress traffic in
pornographic materials and apparently restrictions on contraceptives were
1. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32 (1958).
2. CONN. GSN. STAT. §§ 54-196 (1958).
3. 17 STAT. 598 (1873) prohibited the mailing, importation, and in places subject

to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the advertisement, gift or sale of
articles for the prevention of conception. In 1897, the prohibition was extended to
deposit with a common carrier. 29 STAT. 512 (1897). The provisions of these
statutes are now embodied in 62 STAT. 718 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §552 (1959) ; 36 STAT.
1339 (1911) as amended June 28, 1955, c. 190 §§ 1-2, 69 STAT. 183, as amended 1958,
PUB. L. 85, 796 § 1, 72 STAT. 962, 18 U.S.C. 1471 (1959); 41 STAT. 1060 (1920)
as amended Aug. 28, 1959, PuB. L. 85, 796 § 2, 72 STAT. 962, 18 U.S.C. § 1462
(1959).
4. See, 45 HARV. L. Rtv. 723 (1931) for an analysis of the different types
of statutes passed by the legislatures of various states. The statutes are collected
in Ruppenthal, Criminal Statutes on Birth Control, 10 J. CRIM. L. C., & P.S.
48, 51-61 (1919).

(677)
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thought to be incidental to this purpose. 5 The constitutionality of the
7
0
federal statutes prohibiting the mailing or interstate transportation of

contraceptives was upheld under the commerce clause. The state regulation of contraception has been held to be a valid exercise of the police

power 8 and neither a denial of equal protection through class legislation, 9
nor a deprivation of life or liberty without due process. 10 However, only

in Massachusetts!' and Connecticut 12 is the prohibition against contraceptives and birth control instruction apparently absolute; elsewhere, either
the statutes have made express exceptions for legitimate medical purposes,' 8 or the courts have read such exceptions into the statutes. 14 But
even in Massachusetts the courts have been willing to exclude from the
terms of the statute devices sold and used for the prevention of disease,
notwithstanding the fact that the use of these articles also prevents conception. 1 5 Twice the Supreme Court of the United States has refused to
rule on the constitutionality of statutes which absolutely prohibit the use
or sale of contraceptives; it dismissed appeals for lack of substantial
federal questions16 and lack of standing to sue 17 where appellants, physicians
affected by the statute, based their appeals on the ground that their patients
were deprived of life or liberty without due process of law.
The power of a state to legislate for the health, morals, and general
welfare of its citizenry is subject to the limitations that such legislation
must not be arbitrary or oppressive, but must bear a real and substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.' 8 The
rights to life, liberty, property, and equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment are not absolute, but are held subject to
the fair exercise of the police power. 19 The question raised by the instant
5. See, 6 U. Cm. L. REv. 260, 261 (1939). The Connecticut statute, as originally
enacted in 1879, was part of an obscenity law, but in 1887 it was separated into a
separate section. 23 B.U. L. Ri~v. 115 (1943).
6. In re Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
7. United States v. Popper, 98 Fed. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1899).
8. Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942); State v. Nelson, 126
Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940); Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116 N.E.
265 (1917) ; People v. Sanger, 222 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E. 637 (1918) writ of error
dismissed, 251 U.S. 537 (1919); McConnell v. Knoxville, 172 Tenn. 190, 110 S.W.
2d 478 (1937); State v. Arnold, 217 Wis. 340, 258 N.W. 843 (1935).
9. People v. Byrne, 163 N.Y. Supp. 680 (Sup. Ct. 1916), motion for certificate of
reasonable doubt denied, 99 Misc. 1, 163 N.Y. Supp. 682 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
10. Id. The court held that the statute did not constitute an unreasonable interference with peace of mind by reason of the fact that it impinged upon the right of
women to engage in sexual intercourse without fear of conception.
11. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 300 Mass. 372, 15 N.E.2d 353 (1938).
12. Tileston v. UlIman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942).
13. See People v. Sanger, 22 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E. 627 (1918); McConnell v.
Knoxville, 172 Tenn. 190, 110 S.W.2d 478 (1937).
14. United States v.. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936).
15. Commonwealth v. Corbett, 307 Mass. 7, 29 N.E.2d 151 (1940).
16. Gardner v. Commonwealth, 305 U.S. 559 (1938).
17. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
18. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936) ; Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-112 (1928).
19. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914) ; Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
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case is whether the prohibition of the use of contraceptives by married
women whose lives will be endangered by pregnancy is arbitrary, oppressive, or bears no direct substantial relation to the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare of the public, and thus deprives the plaintiffs of
life and liberty without due process of law. The fact that the statute in
the instant case may be a deterrent to immorality, since it maintains one of
the chief deterrents to fornication, that is, fear of pregnancy, 20 would seem
sufficient reason to sustain its constitutionality in the face of the objection
that it bears no substantial relationship to health, morals, welfare, or safety
of the public. But it has been argued that by allowing distribution of
contraceptives which have been approved as sanitary by a state agency
only to married persons with a doctor's prescription, immorality will in no
way be encouraged, and thus the relationship between health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of the public is removed 2 1 unless birth prevention is to be deemed dangerous to the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare, per se. It is further argued that many courts and legislatures have
recognized a valid medical purpose in the use of 'contraceptives. 22 Indeed,
some courts have indicated, in dictum, that a statute which absolutely
forbids the use of contraceptives might be unconstitutional.2 3 However,
it should be noted that the police power is an extremely broad power. It
is so broad that a state can absolutely prohibit the "manufacture, gift,
purchase, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within its borders . .,,"24
and can pass a law excluding any person who has not been
vaccinated from a school.2 5 A statute which prohibits the manufacture or
transfer of liquor, in effect forbids its use, yet certainly there are valid
medical uses for liquor and valid medical reasons for refusing to be vaccinated; nevertheless, the state can absolutely prohibit the use of liquor
and exclude any non-vaccinated person from school. Furthermore, it would
appear the plaintiffs in the instant case are not deprived of life or liberty
without due process for another reason since there is an alternative to
artificial contraception, namely abstinence.2 In the last analysis, the constitutionality of the statute in question may depend.upon whether or not
the Supreme Court of the United States will be willing to follow the policy
of judicial notice of sociological "facts," set by footnote eleven in Brown v.
Board of Education27 and decide that modern medical and sociological
20. People v. Byrne, 163 N.Y. Supp. 680, 681 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
21. Note, 6 U. CHI. L. Rev. 260 (1939). But cf. Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn.
84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942) ; State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940) where
it is indicated that the statutes are for the general welfare of society.
22. See cases cited at notes 14 & 15 supra.

23. People v. Sanger, 222 N.Y. 192, 194, 118 N.E. 637 (1918) ; McConnell v.
Knoxville, 172 Tenn. 190, 110 S.W.2d 478, 479 (1937).
24. Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1878).
25. Zucht v. King, 26 U.S. 174 (1922). But see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905) where the court indicated that compulsory vaccination which admitted of no exception might be unconstitutional.
26. Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942); Abstinence need not
be absolute; See LATZ, THE RHYTHM OF STERILITY AND FERTILITY IN WOMEN (6th
ed. 1942).
27. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1953).
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authority would support a finding that the absolute prohibition of devices
for the prevention of conception would adversely affect the health of
married people. One of the factors to be considered is the relative ineffectiveness of the statute because if contraceptive devices may be sold
where labeled "for prevention of disease only," and these are the very
devices which, in fact, encourage unlawful sexual intercourse the policy
of the statute is thus undermined.
Robert E. Slota

CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-AN ORAL CONTRACT FOR
LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE
VIOLATES THE

BECAUSE IT

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Dow v. Shoe Corp. of America (S.D. Ill.)
In January 1935, the sales agent of Walter Booth Shoe Company
offered plaintiff an oral lifetime employment contract. Plaintiff left his
job with another company and worked for the defendant and its predecessor, Booth, up to on or about September 10, 1957 when defendant discharged plaintiff. Plaintiff's suit for damages for breach of this lifetime
contract was dismissed by the District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois on the grounds that it did not state a cause of action, since under
the Wisconsin Statute of Frauds,' a contract for lifetime employment is
void unless in writing, because it cannot be performed within a year.
Dow v. Shoe Corp. of America, 176 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Ill. 1959).
The majority of courts have held that contracts for lifetime employment need not be in writing under the Statute of Frauds, since death may
bring about full performance within a year.2 It has also been held that
contracts for life or permanent employment are indefinite hirings, terminable at will, if not supported by any consideration other than the obligation of services to be performed and wages to be paid.8 In determining
what constitutes consideration, these courts have reasoned that it may
consist of a claim for damages for personal injury,4 the giving up of a
1.

Wis.

Rev. STAT. c. 241 § .01 (1955)

provides: "Every agreement that by

its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making shall be void

unless it shall be in writing." Wisconsin law governed the validity of the contract
since it was both executed and performed in that state.
2. J.C. Millett & Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers, 123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D.
Cal. 1954) ; Pierson v. Kingman Mill Co., 91 Kan. 775, 139 Pac. 394 (1914) ; Wright
v. Donaebauer, 137 Tex. 73, 154 S.W.2d 637 (1941) ; Kirkpatrick v. Jackson, 256 Wis.
208, 40 N.W.2d 372 (1941).
3. Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 726, 118 A.2d 316 (1955); Lynas v. Maxwell
Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937) ; Combs v. Standard Oil of Louisiana,
166 Tenn. 88, 59 S.W.2d 525 (1933).
4. Slabon v. St. Louis Car Co., 102 S.W.2d 939 (Mo. App. 1937).
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lifetime job with the government,5 or the conveyance of property to the
employer, 6 but in most jurisdictions the mere giving up of a job is not
sufficient. 7 The courts expressing the minority view hold, however, that
if it is the intention of the parties that a lifetime oral contract is not to be
terminable at will, the contract will be given that construction even
though the only consideration for it as far as the employer is concerned
is the promise of the servant to render the service called for by the contract." The only difference between the two views is that the minority
view goes one step further by deciding the case on the intention of the
parties rather than merely on the language of the agreement. The Wisconsin Statute of Frauds requires contracts which are not capable of performance within a year to be in writing, 9 and the courts of Wisconsin have
decided that under their Statute of Frauds a contract for hire for life
or an indefinite time is terminable at will and is valid although not in
writing. 10 However, in the instant case the district court reasoned that
contracts for life employment are indefinite hirings, and since the parties
do not presume termination by death, they are not affected by the rule
that contracts terminable on a stipulated contingency need not be in
writing."
The court in deciding that an oral lifetime contract is within the
Statute of Frauds is going against the weight of authority which holds
that, since the death of the employee may bring about full performance
within a year, contracts for life employment need not be in writing. 12 The
basis on which the court could have decided the case and been supported
by the weight of authority was that the contract was terminable at will
because no consideration other than services were given the employer.' 3
Under either this view or that espoused by the court the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover damages, because under the court's theory, since there
is no writing, the contract is unenforceable, and under the other the
contract may be terminated at anytime without liability after the termination date. However, it would seem that when a word as definite as life
is used in a contract the parties do not expect the contract to be terminated
except by death, and since to insure justice the court should decide the
5.Heaman v. E. N. Rowell Co., 236 App. Div. 34, 258 N.Y. Supp. 138 (1932).

6. Mt. Pleasant Coal Co. v. Watts, 91 Ind. App. 501, 151 N.E. 7 (1926)

Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544, 46 N.E. 117 (1897).
7. Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 726, 118 A.2d 316 (1955); Lynas v. Maxwell
Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937) ; Combs v. Standard Oil of Louisiana,
166 Tenn. 88, 59 S.W.2d 525 (1933).

8. Eggers v. Armour Co. of Delaware, 129 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1942); Littell

v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1941).

9. Wis. R.v.

STAT.

c. 241 § .01 (1955).

10. Kinzfogl v. Geiner, 265 Wis. 105, 60 N.W.2d 741 (1953) ; Kirkpatrick v.
Jackson, 256 Wis. 208, 40 N.W.2d 372 (1949).
11. Dow v. Shoe Corp. of America, 176 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.Ill. 1959).
12. J.C. Millett & Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers, 123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D.
Cal. 1954) ; Pierson v. Kingman Mill Co., 91 Kan. 775, 139 Pac. 394 (1914) ; Wright
v. Donaebauer, 137 Tex. 73, 154 S.W.2d 637 (1941).
13. Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 726, 118 A.2d 316 (1955); Lynas v. Maxwell

Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937); Combs v. Standard Oil of Louisiana,
166 Tenn. 88, 59 S.W.2d 525 (1933).
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case on the intention of the parties, the court should give the agreement
that effect even though there is no other consideration than the services to
be performed by the employee. Since it seems that the parties intended the
contract to be broken only by death, the plaintiff under this theory would
be entitled to damages for breach of contract.
Edward Broderick

CRIMINAL LAW-MASTER-SERVANT-VICARIOUS
CRIMINAL

LIABILITY.

Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959).
John Koczwara, the defendant, operated a tavern in Scranton, Pennsylvania under a restaurant liquor license issued by the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board. The defendant was indicted and convicted of
violating the Liquor Code although, in fact, the acts in violation had been
committed by his bartender and occurred in the absence of the defendant.
Koczwara had previously been convicted of violation of the Code provision prohibiting Sunday Liquor sales and was sentenced as a second offender, the court imposing an increased fine and imprisonment. The
judgment and sentence were affirmed by the Superior Court1 which held
the fine and imprisonment mandatory under the provisions of the Liquor
Code.2 An appeal was allowed to the Supreme Court because of the importance of the issues as to the extent of the criminal liability of owners
of premises licensed by the State Liquor Board for acts in violation of the
Liquor Code, committed by employees in the employer's absence and
without his knowledge or consent. The court, modifying the judgment,
held that the defendant could be criminally liable for acts committed by
his employees in his absence and without his knowledge or consent, but
that punishment by imprisonment would be a denial of due process in
violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Koczwara,
397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959).
Generally, a master or principal will be liable for the criminal acts
of his servant or agent only if he counselled, incited, commanded or
authorized the acts.3 But the idea of vicarious criminal liability, while
1. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 188 Pa. Super. 153, 146 A.2d 308

2. 47 P.S. § 4-494.

(1958).

3. In Regina v. Saunders, 2 Plowd. 473 (1575), the court construed the scope
of criminal liability for the acts of another so strictly that the man who advised
Saunders to poison his wife and supplied the poison was found not to be an accessory
when Saunders's attempt on his wife's life resulted in the death of their three year
old daughter. Today, while the principles are the same, it is likely that courts would
hold the adviser's counsel and procurement a proximate cause of the death, thereby
rendering him liable. And in Rex v. Huggins, 2 Strange 882 (1730), the English
court clearly rejected the idea of applying the tort doctrine of respondeat superior
to the criminal law. This is the view taken by Justice Musmanno in his dissent in the
instant case. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, supra note 3 at 587, 155 A.2d at 831
(dissenting opinion).
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comparatively recent, is not a new one. As early as 1866, the courts
began to hold employers liable for the criminal acts of servants even if
the employer had no knowledge of the acts. 4 At first; the principle was
applied only in nuisance cases and these were considered an exception to
the general rule, the courts reasoning that while the action is criminal in
form, it is civil in substance, and the object is not to punish the defendant
but to abate the nuisance.5 Libel cases were a second exception to the
strict rules of criminal liability. However, here liability was imposed on
the basis of presumed authorization. The publisher of a paper which
printed libelous matter was held criminally responsible unless he could
show that he had no knowledge of the act and that it had not occurred as
a result of negligent supervision on his part.6 The growth of legislation
creating statutory crimes has seen a consequent extension of the principles of vicarious liability of employers. Statutes in almost every juris7
diction have created petty misdemeanors which require no specific intent.
Proof that the act was committed will be sufficient to impose liability.
Many of these statutes in defining the crimes provide that a master shall
be liable if a servant commits a forbidden act while engaged in the master's
business eliminating the requirement that the master have knowledge of
or authorize the act. Mere proof that the crime was committed by the
employee in the course of his employment results in the employer's conviction.8 Even where statutes make no provision for vicarious liability
courts have interpreted the lack of any requirement of criminal intent and
the need to protect the public as warranting holding the master liable for
the petty misdemeanors of his servants.9 As a result courts have held
employers liable for misdeeds of their servants under statutes controlling
distribution and sale of food and drugs, 10 and milk and milk products;"
and regulating weights and measures, 12 and the operation of motor vehicles.18 The Restatement of Agency states that "A principal may be subject to penalties enforced under the rules of the criminal law for acts done
by a servant or other agent."'14 And commenting that the master can
4. Queen v. Stephens, [1866] 1 Q.B. 702. Not only did the employer prove he
had no knowledge of the action constituting the nuisance, but he also offered to
show that his employees had acted against express orders. Nevertheless, he was
held liable.
5. Ibid.
6. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199 (1871); Commonwealth v.
Rovnianek, 12 Pa. Super. 86 (1899).
7. See, Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. Rzv.
689 (1930).
8. State v. Holm, 201 Minn. 53, 275 N.W. 401 (1937); People v. Hawk, 156
Misc. 870, 283 N.Y. Supp. 531 (1935) aff'd 268 N.Y. 677, 198 N.E. 55 (1935) ; State
v. Weisberg, 74 Ohio App. 91, 55 N.E.2d 870 (1943).
9. Mullinix v. People, 76 Ill. 211 (1875); Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass.
141, 93 N.E. 249 (1910).
10. People v. Biggs, 69 Cal. App.2d 819, 160 P.2d 600 (1945); Groff v. State,
171 Ind. 547, 83 N.E. 769 (1909).
11. State v. Burnham, 71 Wash. 199, 128 Pac. 218 (1912). Commonwealth v.
Jackson, 146 Pa. Super. 328, 22 A.2d 299 (1941).
12. Commonwealth v. Sacks, 214 Mass. 12, 100 N.E. 1019 (1913).
13. Commonwealth v. Babb, 166 Pa. Super. 63, 70 A.2d 660 (1950).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 217d (1958).
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reasonably anticipate the commission of minor crimes in the conduct of
business it states that an act even though consciously criminal may be
within the scope of the employment. 15 Statutes regulating the distribution and sale of intoxicating beverages fall into this category, as well.
But there has been wide disagreement as to whether knowledge or acquiescence on the part of the employer is necessary to charge him with
liability. Some courts adhere strictly to the classic principles for imposing
criminal liability and require knowledge or acquiescence. Others impose
liability without proof of such knowledge on the basis of statutory interpretation, on analogy to nuisance cases, or on the ground of public policy.' 6
And while generally, the penalty imposed is merely a fine, there are jurisdictions which have imposed imprisonment.' 7
The view taken by the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
regarding the imposing of penalties on employers held liable for acts of
employees without the knowledge or acquiescence of the employer appears to be the better view. It is well to distinguish between true crimes
involving participation, the requisite intent and moral delinquence, where
guilt should be personal, and those petty misdemeanors which involve
violations of statutes which utilize the criminal administration machinery
to enforce social regulations substantially civil in nature. It can be reasoned
that losses incurred through payment of fines levied for such violations are
incident to the operation of the business, and are to be borne by those for
whose profit the business is conducted. The operator of the tavern or
restaurant should bear the risks and losses involved in its operation.
Until now, it appears that Pennsylvania has been among those jurisdictions which considered the unlawful act of an employee to be prima
facie evidence of assent thereto by the employer, and imposed liability
unless the employer could rebut it.' 8 By holding the defendant liable, in
the instant case, where the evidence showed he in fact could not have
known, Pennsylvania is now among those jurisdictions which on the basis
of statutory interpretation, hold that lack of knowledge is no defense. 19
More significant is the Pennsylvania court's holding imprisonment of one
vicariously liable unconstitutional as a denial of due process in violation of
21
20
the Pennsylvania State Constitution. Both California and Colorado,
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 231 (1958).
16. Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REv.
689 (1930), is a full and complete treatment of the early development of law and

15.

policy.

17. Ex Parte Marley, 29 Cal.2d 525, 175 P.2d 832 (1946) ; Hershorn v. State,
108 Colo. 43, 113 P.2d 680 (1941).
18. Commonwealth v. Martin, 186 Pa. Super. 412, 142 A.2d 467 (1958)
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 146 Pa. Super. 328, 22 A.2d 299 (1941).
19. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in an earlier case, Commonwealth v.
Borek, 161 Pa. Super. 200, 54 A.2d 101 (1947), speaks in terms of ignorance of the
facts or state of things as they are as being no excuse for violation, but in view of the
clear language in Commonwealth v. Martin, supra note 19, this view was not, at least
until now, entirely accepted.
20. Ex Parte Marley, 29 Cal. 2d 525, 175 P.2d 832 (1946).
21. Hershorn v. State, 108 Colo. 43, 113 P.2d 680 (1941).
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at least, have permitted sentences, including short terms of imprisonment
in similar cases. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Lambert v. California, 22 declaring unconstitutional, as a denial of due
process, a statute making unknowing conduct criminal would appear to
have no bearing on the constitutionality of the statutes of the type here
in question. 23 But whether or not imprisonment of persons convicted of
statutory offenses without fault is constitutional under the Federal or any
state constitution, such results are inimical to American standards of
criminal justice. Where imprisonment is to be imposed, the individual
interest of the defendant is far too serious to permit conviction without
regard to intent or knowledge. In the interest of enforcing regulatory
legislation, no one objects to the imposition of small fines against employers for violations of employees. And it is possible that there are only
slight objections to short terms of imprisonment being imposed where an
owner knowingly. permits his employees to sell liquor to minors. The
final answer may lie in shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to
show that he in fact did not know of his employee's violation and was not
present when it occurred.
Catherine McEntee

EVIDENCE-PROOF

OF MURDER WITHOUT A BODY-SUFFICIENCY

OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE To PROVE THE CORPUS

DELICTI IN A MURDER PROSECUTION.

People v. Scott, (Cal. 1960).
Defendant was tried for the murder of his wife after she disappeared from home not to be heard from thereafter. There was no
evidence of violence or other means of death and no body or part of
a body was ever found. The state sought to prove by circumstantial
evidence not only that the defendant's wife had no motive to run away
or kill herself, but that it would be unreasonable for her to do so. Evidence
was introduced tending to show that the alleged victim was intelligent,
happy, possessed of a more than ample income, and was in good health

both physical and mental.1 Part of the circumstantial evidence introduced
to establish defendant's guilt showed that his desire for her wealth was
22. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
23. The Lambert case involved a parole violation, classically within the area
of true crimes, rather than statutory crimes classed as petty misdemeanors. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of federal statutes imposing
prison terms without regard to knowledge or criminal intent in cases of the petty
misdemeanor type (although none are based on vicarious liability). See, United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
1. People v. Scott, 1 Cal. Rptr. 600, 604 (1960).
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a possible motive for the murder, that after her disappearance he forged
her name to thirteen instruments, that he told confusing and conflicting
stories to account for her absence, and that he fled to Canada after his
release on bail from the forgery offense because he feared that he would
be charged with her murder. Although no body or part of a body was
ever found, the state introduced a denture and two pairs of glasses belonging to the alleged victim which were found on a lot near defendant's
home, and produced witnesses who testified that she could not read
without her glasses and was never seen without her denture.2 In order
to rebut the possible inference that the spouse was murdered, the defense
introduced witnesses who testified that they saw the alleged victim after
the date of her disappearance. The jury found defendant guilty of murder
in the first degree and defendant appealed on the grounds, inter alia, that
the evidence was insufficient to establish the corpus delicti. The district
court of appeals affirmed, holding that the elements of the corpus delicti
in a murder prosecution can be proved by circumstantial evidence, provided such evidence is sufficient to preclude every reasonable theory of
innocence of the accused. People v. Scott, 1 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1960).
The confusion which surrounds the phrase corpus delicti would seem
to arise from viewing these words as meaning the body of the victim of a
murder, instead of according to them their proper meaning which is the
body or essential elements of the crime.3 In truth all crimes have a corpus
delicti which must be proved by the prosecution, but in a murder prosecution in which the corpus delicti must be proved solely by circumstantial
evidence a special problem as to the sufficiency of such evidence may
arise. The corpus delicti of a murder consists of two elements, 4 the death
of a human being and a criminal agency as the cause of that death. Probably because of the gravity of murder and the finality of the punishment
which is sometimes meted out for this offense, some states by statute
require direct evidence of the crime 5 while the law of other states requires
that the victim's body, or part of it, be found.8 But in the absence of
statute, when a murderer disposes or attempts to dispose of his victim
the court is usually faced with one of three possible factual situations.
The first situation occurs when only fragments of the victim's body are
2. Id. at 608-609.
3. People v. Watters, 202 Cal. 154, 259 Pac. 442 (1927).
4. People v. Moran, 144 Cal. 48, 77 Pac. 777 (1904) ; People v. Mondich, 234
Mich. 590, 208 N.W. 675 (1926) ; 2 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIMES, §§ 424, 425 (1946).
But see, Deiterle v. State, 101 Fla. 79, 134 So. 42 (1931) ; Smith v. State, 137 Tex.
Crim. 544, 132 S.W.2d 868 (1939).
5. MONT. REv. STAT. § 10962 (1921) "No person can be convicted of murder
or manslaughter unless the death of the person alleged to have been killed, and
the fact of the killing by the defendant as alleged, are established as independent
acts; the former by direct proof and the latter beyond reasonable doubt." See also
State v. Cates, 97 Mont. 173, 33 P.2d 578 (1934) ; State v. Sogge, 36 N.D. 262, 161
N.W. 1022 (1917).
6. TEx. PENAL CODE art. 1204 (1948) "No person shall be convicted of any
grade of homicide unless the body of the deceased, or portions of it, are found and
sufficiently identified to establish the fact of death of the person charged to have
been killed." See also Follis v. State, 51 Tex, Crim. 186, 101 S.W. 242 (1907).
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found.7 In such a case there is direct proof of the death, albeit a problem
of identification of the body may arise. 8 However, since only the second
element of the corpus delicti, the criminal agency causing the death, remains
to be proved by circumstantial evidence, most courts will uphold a conviction founded upon such circumstantial evidence. 9 The second possibility is that although no trace of the body of the victim is ever found,
the accused has offered an extra-judicial confession which he later repudiates.1" In this situation most courts will not allow the corpus delicti to
be established by the uncorroborated confession of the accused," but will
allow the prosecution to use circumstantial evidence to corroborate the2
confession or to prove the corpus delicti independent of the confession.'
The third factual situation arises as in the instant case, where no body of
the deceased is found and there is no confession by the accused.1 3 Although modern English cases have held that both elements of the corpus
delicti may be proved by circumstantial evidence, 14 there is a split of
authority in this country on the matter.15
Authority for the rule that there can be no conviction for murder
unless the body of the alleged victim is produced or accounted for is
usually traced to a statement made by Sir Mathew Hale.10 Some early
cases seized on this dictum and applied it indiscriminately thereby giving it
the effect of a rule of law which provided there must be a body produced
in order that a conviction for murder may be sustained.' 7 Today with
modern scientific methods available completely to destroy all traces of a
cadaver such a rule would merely benefit the murderer most successful in
disposing of his victim. Although there is a danger that a hapless defendant may be a victim of circumstances and convicted while the alleged
victim is really alive,' 8 such situations are rare and notwithstanding their
7. Commonwealth v. Williams, 171 Mass. 461, 50 N.E. 1035 (1898).
8. Deiterle v. State, 101 Fla. 79, 134 So. 42 (1931); Tarkaney v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 790, 43 S.W.2d 34 (1931).
9. Commonwealth v. Williams, 171 Mass. 461, 50 N.E. 1035 (1898) ; State v.
Barnes, 47 Ore. 592, 85 Pac. 998 (1906).
10. Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943).
11. Hill v. State, 207 Ala. 444, 93 So. 460 (1922). Compare Commonwealth v.
Gardner, 282 Pa. 458, 128 At. 87 (1925), with Black v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 173,
128 S.W.2d 406 (1939).
12. State v. Kauffman, 329 Mo. 813, 46 S.W.2d 843 (1932) ; Black v. State,
supra note 11.

13. Regina v. Onufrejczyk, [1955] 1 Q.B. 388.
14. Regina v. Onufrejczyk, supra note 13; The King v. Horry, [1952] N.Z.L.R.

111.
15. Majority: United States v. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287 (No. 15204) (C.C.
Mass. 1858) ; People v. Clark, 70 Cal. App. 531, 233 Pac. 980 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925) ;
Stacking v. State, 7 Ind. 326 (1855) ; Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31
A.2d 155 (1943). Minority: People v. Bennett, 49 N.Y. 137 (1872) ; Ruloff v. People,
18 N.Y. 179 (1858) ; See also supra notes 5 and 6.
16. "I would never convict any person of murder or manslaughter unless the
facts were proved to be done or at least the body found." [emphasis added]. As
quoted in Edwards, Murder Without A Body -The

Legal Aspect, 1955 CRIM. L.

REv. (Eng.) 205, 208. Note that the disjunctive word "or" was used.
17. Ruloff v. People, 18 N.Y. 179 (1858) ; R. v. Kersey, [1908] 21 Cox Crim.
Cas. 690; See also Edwards, supra note 16.
18. See Edwards, supra note 16, at 209-10.
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possibility, society must be permitted to protect itself against the situation
where a murder is committed and the body is completely destroyed. 19
Therefore the majority rule is that no body need be found and that both
20
elements of the corpus delicti may be proved by circumstantial evidence
21
if that is the best evidence available.
In cases where the corpus delicti
is proved solely by circumstantial evidence some courts have seemingly
applied a standard of proof different from the usual "beyond all reasonable doubt" test. 22 It has thus been argued that some pf the language
used 23 sets up a standard of proof somewhere between the burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the unattainable positive
proof of guilt. 24 The test applied in the instant case was whether cir-

cumstantial evidence was sufficient to supply proof of gtilt so convincing
as to preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence2 It is submitted
that such a test as this, which demands that no reasonable hypothesis of
innocence exist before a verdict of guilty can be justified, is the same as
the test which requires proof of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. In
the final analysis each case will depend on its particular factual situation
and no hard and fast rules should be laid down. It would seem however
that in every case the best evidence available should be required and that
the requisite standard of proof should be phrased in terms of the traditional "beyond all reasonable doubt."
Joseph G. Manta

STARE DECISIS-EFFECT

OF OVERRULING PRIOR DECISION-JUDICIAL

ABOLITION OF GOVERNMENTAL

IMMUNITY FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS

GIVEN PROSPECTIVE

APPLICATION.

Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit DistrictNo. 302 (Ill. 1959).
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant school district for
personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the negligence of the
school district's agent. The complaint did not allege the existence of any
19. United States v. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287 (No. 15204) (C.C. Mass. 1858) ;

People v. Clark, 70 Cal. App. 531, 233 Pac. 980 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925); Regina v.
Onufrejczyk, [1955] 1 Q.B. 388.
20. United States v. Gilbert, supra note 19; Warmke v. Commonwealth, 297
Ky. 649, 180 S.W.2d 872 (1944) ; Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d
155 (1943). However merely showing a person is missing is not sufficient, State v.
Johnson, 193 N.C. 701, 138 S.E. 19 (1927).
21. State v. Epes, 209 S.C. 296, 39 S.E.2d 769 (1946).
22. Edwards, Murder Without A Body-

The Legal Aspects, 1955 CRIM. L. REv.

(Eng.) 205, 214.
23. Id. at 214-15.
24. Id. at 215.
25. People v. Scott, 1 Cal. Rptr. 600, 619 (1960).
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insurance or other non-public funds out of which a judgment might be
satisfied, although in fact, the defendant did carry limited insurance pursuant to an Illinois statute' which permitted a school district to carry
insurance and thereby waive its immunity to the extent of the insurance
coverage. Defendant's 'motion to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that
a school district is not liable for the torts of its agents, was sustained,
and judgment was entered for defendant. The appellate court affirmed,
but the Supren e Court of Illinois, with two Justices dissenting, overruled prior decihions to hold that a school district would no longer be
immune from tort liability. However, except as to the plaintiff in the
instant case, 2 the rule herein established was held to be applicable only
to cases arising'%ut of future occurrences.3 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit DistrictNo. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959).
Although overruling decisions are generally applied retroactively, 4 an
exception to this rule has arisen from a dictum in Ohio Life Ins. & Trust
Co. v. Debolt,5 Which proposed that an overruling decision should not be
given retrospective operation so as to affect contract or property rights
acquired in reliance upon the overruled decision. 6 The cases recognizing
this "contract or property exception" hold that a property or contract
interest which has vested under an overruled decision should not be disturbed 7 -unless stronger policy considerations override those interests.8
Thus, the policy of protecting government revenues has generally led the
federal courts to apply overruling decisions in tax cases either prospectively
or retrospectively, whichever will better secure the tax for the government. 9
1. ILL. R~v. STAT. c. 122, § 29-11a (1957).
2. The court reasoned that merely to announce the abrogation of the rule of
immunity without applying it would render such announcement mere dictum and,
moreover, deprive the appellant of the fruits of his appeal. Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 97-98 (Ill.
1959).
3. For a discussion of the issue of judicial abolition of governmental immunity
for school districts, see articles cited in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 90-91 (Ill. 1959). Although the courts and legislatures
of many states have been chopping away, piecemeal, at the doctrine of governmental
immunity from tort liability, especially in regard to schools and school districts, no
court has gone as far as the Supreme Court of Illinois in the instant case, wherein
it expressly repudiated the common law doctrine and overruled the prior cases which
affirmed protection for school districts.

4. Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L. Rzv.

121 (1940) ;Note, 60 HARV. L. Ri~v. 437 (1947).
5. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 997 (1853).
6. Id. at 1003.
7. Gross v. Board of Commr's, 158 Ind. 531, 64 N.E. 25 (1902) ; Center School
Township v. State, 150 Ind. 168, 174, 49 N.E. 961, 963 (1898); Mason v. Nelson,
148 N.C. 492, 62 S.E. 625 (1908).
8. Such considerations may be that since a purchaser at a sheriff's sale takes
at his own risk, if the statute authorizing the sale is subsequently held unconstitutional, the sale is void. Barrett v. Brown, 26 Cal. 2d 328, 158 P.2d 568 (1945) ; or
the interest of the public in the prohibition of gambling may precipitate the retrospective application of adtoverruling decision to invalidate a lease of premises to be
used for pari-mutual wagering. Auditorium Kennel Club v. Atlantic City, 16 N.J.
Misc. 354, 199 Atd. 908 (Super. Ct. 1938).
9. See, 60 HARV. L. Rev. 437, 444-445 and cases cited therein. There seems to
be no guiding principle, however, in the state courts decisions in this field.
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In cases involving public officers who have acted in reliance upon statutes
which have subsequently been declared unconstitutional, the courts have
held that the officers are not civilly liable, provided that they acted in
good faith.10 Another exception to the general rule of retroactivity has
arisen in the field of personal liberty, where it has been held that an overruling decision, which makes what was formerly innocent conduct
criminal, will only be given prospective application,' and conversely,
when that which was formerly declared to be criminal is held to be innocent, a conviction will not stand.' 2 In the field of tort law, however, prospective application of overruling decisions is rare and has only been applied in a few cases involving changes in rules of procedure and evidence
peculiar to tort law.13 Thus, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey
abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity,' 4 it denied merely prospective application of the overruling decision, reasoning that "reliance has
very

little place anywhere

in the

field of tort."' 5

Subsequently,

the

Superior Court of New Jersey held that a cause of action arising out of
the tortious conduct of the defendant is a property right protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus a child, who was tortiously injured
by a charitable institution prior to the abolition of charitable immunity
in New Jersey, did have a cause of action against the charity.' 6
The rule announced in the instant case impliedly proposes that the
doctrine of prospective application should not be dealt with as an exception to the general rule of retroactive application but, rather, that the
10. Golden v. Thompson, 194 Miss. 241, 11 So.2d 906, 907 (1943); Dolton v.
Harms, 327 11. App. 107, 125, 63 N.E.2d 785, 793 (1945) ; but see, Allen v. Holbrook,
130 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242 (1943).
11. State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940).
12. Partain v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 270, 141 P.2d 124 (1943) ; but see Warring
v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941) cert denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941). A writ
of habeas corpus was sought after a conviction based on a precedent subsequently
overruled, and the court denied the writ.
13. Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). There the rule
determining the right of the defendant to instructions on damages in a personal
injury suit was given prospective application. Courts have no difficulty applying
rules of evidence prospectively, whether or not they are within the area of torts.
See, County of Los Angles v. Faus, 48 Cal.2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957).
14. The Supreme Court of New Jersey handed down three decisions simultaneously in the attack on charitable immunity. Benton v. YMCA of Westfield,
27 N.J. 67, 141 A.2d 298 (1958) ; Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J.
29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 141
A.2d 273 (1958).
15. Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, supra, note 14, 141 A.2d at 275,
citing, HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW, 654 (10th ed. 1957). The court added, however, that the

defendant charity did not allege any reliance upon the doctrine of governmental
immunity in failing to protect itself by insurance, and moreover, that all of the
courts which had previously rejected the immunity doctrine had done so retrospectively. See, McCaskill, Respondeat Superior as Applied in New York to
Quasi-Public and Eleemosynary Institutions, 5 CORNELL L. Q. 409, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 56
(1920) pointing out the extent to which the charity decisions have been influenced by
the governmental rule and the extent to which the basis for the immunity of
.zovernments and charities is ti-e same. Compare, Priossr., ToRTs, pp. 770-780 with
784-788 (2d ed. 1955).
16. Terracciona v. Magee, 148 A.2d 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1959), citing Pickering
v. Peskind, 43 Ohio App. 401, 183 N.E. 301 (Ct. App. 1930).
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so called "contract exception" should be expanded to include all cases
in which the parties have relied on the overruled precedent and would
be prejudiced by retroactive application. Many courts have spoken of the
application of the overruling decision in accordance with reliance, undue
hardship, and the principles of fairness and justice, but no court has yet
based a decision applying an overruling decision prospectively solely upon
these principles.' 7 Among the objections raised to the reliance test as a
criterion for the prospective application of overruling decisions are the
evidentiary problems involved in proving reliance, the difficulties arising
out of a situation where a party has not changed his position throughout
a cycle of changes in the law, and the efficacy of reliance upon a clearly
invalid law.' 8 A further objection, one voiced by the dissenting Justice
in the instant case, is that others whose cause of action has arisen along
with the plaintiff's in the instant case, 19 and all those who have been
tortiously injured as a result of the negligence of a school district, prior to
the date of the decision in the instant case but before the running of the
statute of limitations, are denied their right of recovery by the prospective
application of the decision. This objection was disposed of by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst
Oil & Refining Co.,20 where it was held that a state, in deciding its adherence to precedent, could choose for itself "between the principle of
forward operation and that of relation backward." '21 Whenever an appellate court assumes to overturn an established precedent the question of
whether this particular precedent would have been better dealt with by
the legislature arises. But it would certainly be strange for the very
courts which have built and fortified the immunity rule to sit back and
2
wait for the legislature to overturn the value judgments they have made.
And if they choose to overturn such judgments, it is within their power
to apply the new rule prospectively, but the problem of the formulation of
a clear basis for prospective application of overruling decisions remains
unsolved by decisions like the one in the instant case.
Robert E. Slota
17. See cases cited by Snyder, supra, note 4, at 140-153.
18. 60 HARV. L. REv. 437, 438-439 (1947).
19. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 104-105.

(I1. 1959).
20. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
21. Ibid at 365. For a further consideration of the constitutional problem see,
Snyder, supra, note 4; Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem In
ConstitutionalLaw, 38 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1939).
22. 38 COLUM. L. Rgv. 1485, 1489 (1938) speaking of the judicial abolition of
charitable immunity.
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INFANT MAY MAINTAIN AN ACTION

FOR PRENATAL INJURIES.

Smith v. Brennan (N.J. 1960).
An action was brought to recover damages for injuries, sustained in
an auto accident caused by defendant's negligence, to an infant plaintiff
while he was in his mother's womb. The Law Division dismissed the
complaint on the ground that New Jersey law did not recognize a cause
of action for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for trial and held that the infant plaintiff was
entitled to recover for a prenatal injury thus overruling a previous decision 1 to the contrary. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960).
Prior to 1949, American Courts of last resort held that under the
common law an infant could not recover for prenatal injuries.

The

2
precedent for these decisions was established in Dietrich v. Northampton

where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that there could

not be recovery under a wrongful death statute because an unborn child
is part of its mother and thus not a person, within the meaning of the
statute, at the time of the injury.3 Notwithstanding that the Dietrich
case was concerned solely with the construction of a wrongful death
statute, in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital4 it was used as authority for
denying recovery for prenatal injuries even where the infant had survived.
While these two decisions carried considerable weight in the long line of
cases denying recovery for prenatal injuries,5 additional grounds were
advanced for such a result. One court denied recovery from a common
carrier on the basis that there was no contractual relationship between
it and the "non-existent" child, and therefore, it owed a duty of care
only to the mother." Another ground advanced for dismissing such an
action was the fear that it might be possible for an infant to maintain an
1. Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942).
2. Dietrick v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); The line of Massachusetts
cases following this case has recently been reversed in that state by the case of
Keyes v. Construction Service Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1960) where the court
allowed recovery for pre-natal injuries although adopting the viability test.
3. The infant's mother was between four and five months advanced in pregnancy
when she fell because of the defective condition of the street of the defendant town.
The fall resulted in a miscarriage, and it is doubtful that the child lived at all
after birth though some signs of life were noted for a short period.
4. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
5. Smith v. Luckhardt, 229 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939) ; Bliss v.
Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1951) ; Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60,
274 N.W. 710 (1937); Briel v. United Railways Co., 248 Mo., 126, 154 S.W. 71
(1913); Drabbels v. Skelley Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Berlin
v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I.
169, 49 Ati. 704 (1900); Lewis v. Steve's Sash & Door Co., 177 S.W.2d 350
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis.
272, 159 N.W.916 (1916).
6. Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 139 N.Y. Supp. 367 (App. Div. 1913),
appeal dismissed, 209 N.Y. 515, 102 N.E. 1107 (1913).
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action against its mother for injuries caused by her negligence. 7 However, the most frequent rationale appearing in cases dismissing actions
for prenatal injuries was the belief that there was an inherent difficulty
in proof of causation, and consequently a substantial number of fictitious
claims would result. s In 1946, the first significant break from this view
occurred when a federal district court approved a prenatal injury petition in a case in which the common law was relied upon solely. 9 Three
years later the supreme courts of Ohio 10 and Minnesota" became the
first state courts to adopt a view contrary to that established in the
Dietrich case. These decisions provided the impetus for other state courts
in which the question was an original one, and soon there was a substantial number of cases in which recovery for prenatal injuries was
14
allowed where the child was born either alive 12 or dead.13 In Illinois,
15
6
Missouri, and New York the question was not an original one but
the impact of the newly developing trend was great enough to cause an
overruling of earlier decisions denying recovery for prenatal injuries.
However, even in the face of this liberal trend, recovery was still severely
limited by the requirement that the injuries must have been inflicted at
a time when the foetus was capable of extra-uterine existence. This requirement, known as the viability theory, 7 was adhered to without any
decisions of a court of last resort to the contrary until the Georgia supreme
court in Horbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co.,' 8 held that the particular moment of the prenatal injury is immaterial since a human life comes
into existence at the time of conception.' 9 While there is considerable
merit to this view, it appears that it has been adopted by only one other
20
state court of last resort.
The New Jersey court in overruling Stemmer v. Kline2' has rid itself of an outmoded precedent and has now taken its place with the in7. Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
8. Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944
(1935) ; Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
9. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
10. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Corp., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334
(1949).
11. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
12. Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956) ; Tucker
v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.W.2d 909 (1951);
Damasiewicz v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953) ; Mallison v. Pemeroy,
205 Or. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955).
13. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); Rainey v. Horn,
221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1950) ; Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135
A.2d 249 (1957).
14. Armann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
15. Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 597 (1953).
16. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
17. This theory was first advocated by Justice Boggs in his dissenting opinion
in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
18. Horbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E,2d 727 (1956).
19. This theory was first recognized by a New York intermediate appellate

court in Kelley v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Div. 1953).
20. Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958).
21. Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489; In this case it was held
that in the absence of a statute there was no right of action for prenatal injuries.
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creasing number of jurisdictions which permit actions for prenatal injuries. This trend appears to be fully justified when examined in the
light of the basic reasons advanced for denying the maintenance of such
suits. First, it is argued that an unborn child is part of its mother, and
hence no independent duty of care can be owed to it. Completely ignored
by this rationale is the fact that medical authorities 22 and other branches
of the law2 3 have recognized that an unborn child has a separate existence
at conception. The second reason advanced is the fear of fraudulent claims
arising because of the difficulty of proof of causation, but this difficulty
does not appear to be a valid reason for not permitting one to maintain an
action. Fear of fraudulent claims should be relieved by requiring competent medical evidence to prove the necessary causal relationship. Since
this is the approach taken in other cases in which a causal relationship
must be shown, it should be an acceptable solution in prenatal injury
cases. As a result of its rejection of the viability theory, the court in the
instant case has adopted a position which is more liberal than that of most
jurisdictions which allow these actions. By treating conception as that
time when an unborn child acquires separate existence the court has
adhered to a view which is entirely consistent with the treatment of the
medical profession and other branches of the law. Such a result is fully
justified on the grounds of both legal and medical principals.
Harry J. Oxman

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY
TORTS

OF TAVERN KEEPER FOR

OF MINOR PATRON.

Rappaport v. Nichols (N.J. 1959).
The defendants, owners of certain taverns in Newark, New Jersey, sold
alcoholic beverages to another defendant, a minor. The minor then became involved in an automobile accident resulting from his negligence in
which plaintiff's intestate was killed and plaintiff's car damaged. Plaintiff brought suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey alleging that the
sales to the minor negligently caused the accident because the alcoholic
beverages made him intoxicated and unfit to operate an automobile. The
Superior Court ruled as a matter of law that the sale to the minor could
not be the proximate cause of the accident. However, the Supreme Court
22. PROSSER, TORTS § 36 (2d ed. 1955).
23. Criminal law regards an unborn child as a separate entity. In re Vince
2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 111 (1949). The law of property and decedents estates considers the infant in being for purposes beneficial to his interests. In re Haines' Will,
98 N.J.Eq. 628, 129 Att. 867 (1925).
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of New Jersey reversed the judgment on the grounds that if the tavern
keepers negligently sold alcoholic beverages to a minor causing his intoxication which in turn resulted in his negligent operation of a motor
vehicle, a jury could find that the selling of the alcoholic beverages was
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Rappaport v. Nichols, 33 N.J.
183, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
It is generally held that there is no common law liability imposed on
a tavern owner for injuries to a third party caused by a customer who
consumes alcoholic beverages served by the owner.' The common law
absolved the vendor of liability on the theory that it is the consumption of
the alcoholic beverages by the inebriate and not the sale which is the
proximate cause of the injury to the third person. 2 Furthermore, courts
have frequently denied liability even though the sale of alcoholic beverages
violates a statute or ordinance, as where the sale is to an intoxicated
person 3 or a minor, 4 thus refusing to say that such violation is negligence
per se. 5 The inebriate or his wife has been denied recovery where the
serving by the tavernkeeper was negligent,6 on the grounds of contributory
negligence,7 but has been allowed recovery where the injury was inflicted
intentionally 8 or with wanton disregard.9 The common law rule has
been modified in some jurisdictions to allow an injured third party to
recover from the vendor where the intoxicated person had no volition
when served in the defendant's establishment,10 as where addicted to
alcohol" or intoxicated to the point of helplessness.' 2 The reasoning the
courts use in such cases is that the inebriate is in such a condition that it
1. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94
Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Cruse v. Arden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73
(1889) ; Cowman v. Hansen, 92 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1958) ; Joyce v. Hatfield, 197
Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951); Christoff v. Gradsky, 140 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio App.
1956) ; Demege v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936).
2. Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. (D.C. Alaska 1950) ; Fleckner v.
Dionne, supra note 1; Henry Grady Hotel v. Surgio, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S.E.2d
329 (1943); Cowman v. Hansen, supra note 1; Joyce v. Hatfield, supra note 1;
Beck v. Gore, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955) ; Christoff v. Gradsky, supra
note 1; Seidel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
3. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955) ; Hitson v. Dwyer, supra
note 2: Seidel v. Leach, supra note 2; Contra Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341,
146 A.2d 648 (1958).
4. Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949).
5. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955).
6. Sobolewski v. German, 32 Del. 540, 127 Atl. 49 (1924) ; Gearing v. Berkson,
223 Mass. 257. 111 N.E. 785 (1916) ; Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263
N.W. 154 (1935) ; Lurie v. Mammone, 200 Misc. 320, 107 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sup. Ct.
1951); Howard v. Verdigrio Valley Electric Co-op., 201 Okla. 504, 207 P.2d 784
(1949).
7. Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (Super. Ct. 1955)

Cavin v. Smith, 228 Minn. 322, 37 N.W.2d 368 (1949).
8. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940); Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D.
161, 290 N.W.482 (1940).
9. Nally v. Blanford, 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956); McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex.
168 (1883).
10. Nally v. Blanford, supra note 9.
11. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940).

12. Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Ore. 92, 35 P.2d 672 (1934).
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is forseeable by the tavern keeper that he may injure someone. 13 Many
states in order to avoid the harshness of the case law and to impose liability on tavern keepers 14 have passed "Civil Damage" or "Dram Shop"
Acts.' 5 However, in the principal case the court reasoned that even without a Dram Shop Act a jury could find that the selling of the alcoholic
beverages was the proximate cause of the injury. 16
In some instances the court does rule as a matter of law on proximate
causation, but it would seem that where reasonable men may differ the
court should allow the jury to decide as a question of fact whether the
selling of alcoholic beverages was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury. The tortfeasor's conduct was a cause of the event if it was a substantial factor in bringing it about,' 7 and it was the proximate cause if the
injury sustained was forseeable. I8 The tavern keeper in the instant case
violated a statute' 9 which was intended for the benefit of the public20
and thereby became liable for the forseeable damages resulting from such
violation. 21 The grave danger connected with the operation of automobiles
by drunken drivers under modern traffic conditions is a matter of common
knowledge. 22 The vital point of inquiry would seem to be whether the
vendor knew or ought to have known that the vendee would drive on
13. Nally v. Blanford, 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956).
14. The Dram Shop Acts were passed to encourage temperance and as a means
of assuring compensation to those persons who are injured as a result of another
person's intoxication. Ogelive, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop
Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 175.
15. The Iowa Dram Shop Act provides: "Every wife, child, parent, guardian,
employer or other person who shall be injured in person or property or means of
support by an intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or
otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action in his own name against any
person who shall, by selling or giving to another contrary to the provisions of this
title any intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication of such person, for all damages
actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages." IowA CoDE ANN. § 129.2
(Supp. 1959). See AlA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 135 (Supp. 1959); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 7 (Supp. 1953) ; ILL. REv. STAT. c. 43, § 135 (Supp. 1957) ; ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. c. 61, § 95 (Supp. 1957) ; MIcH. ComP. LAWs. § 436.22 (Mason Supp. 1956) ;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. Civ. RIrHTS LAW. § 16; N.D.
REv. CODE § 5-0121 (Supp. 1959) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 121 (Supp. 1958);
VT. STAT. § 6214 (Supp. 1959). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 716 (Supp. 1958)
(only the spouse, child, or employer of the intoxicated person can sue); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-322 (Supp. 1959) (only the parent, guardian or employer of an unmarried
mtinor can sue) ; ORE. Rev. STAT. § 30, 730 (Supp. 1957) (only the spouse, parent,
or employer can sue).
16. Rappaport v. Nichols, 33 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 9 (1959).
17. Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1951)
Walton v. Blauert, 256 Wis. 125, 40 N.W.2d 545 (1949).
18. Casey v. Burns, 7 Il1. App. 2d 316, 129 N.E.2d 440 (1955).
19. The New Jersey statute provides: "Anyone who sells any alcoholic beverages to a minor shall be guilty of a misdemeanor". N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-77
(Supp. 1959).
20. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959)
State v. Dahnke, 244 Iowa 599, 57 N.W.2d 533 (1953).
21. Larkins v. Kohhmeyer, 229 Ind. 391, 98 N.E.2d 896 (1951); Osbourne v.
McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543 (1899).
22. It is estimated that in 1958, 37,000 persons lost their lives in motor vehicle
accidents, and another 1,350,000 were injured. 1960 PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN ALMANAc 239.
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the public highways in an intoxicated condition. 23 If he had such actual or
constructive knowledge, he should not be allowed to argue, that such a
consequence was unforseeable, and hence an intervening cause which would
relieve him from liability. 24 It is submitted that even though the New

Jersey legislature had earlier repealed a Dram Shop Act 25 the court in
the instant case did not usurp the function of the legislature by making
law, but by deciding that the forseeability of the consequences posed a
jury issue, merely applied what the common law of negligence has always
been.2 6 It would not seem that it was the court's intention to make tavern
keepers insurers of the public, but to apply only the ordinary rules of
negligence and hold them to the familiar duty of care of a reasonable man
under the circumstances. This test would not deprive them of the opportunity factually to prove that they acted reasonably, nor preclude the opportunity to employ the doctrine of contributory negligence in the proper
case.
Edward Broderick
23. Campbell, Work of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rzv. 1,
117.

24. Casey v. Burns, 7 Ill. App. 2d 316, 129 N.E.2d 440 (1955); Andreoli v.
Natural Gas Co., 57 N.J. Super. 356, 154 A.2d 726 (1959).
25. N.J. LAWS 1922 c. 257, p. 628.
26. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, 462 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
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